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PLEASE, SIR, I WANT SOME MORE:1
CAN EPA CONTINUE TO FEED THE SUPERFUND
ORPHAN SHARE?
I. INTRODUCTION
As the nation progresses toward the new millennium, the
maintenance and preservation of the environment continues to
pose serious concerns for individuals, corporations and govern-
ment. The days of indiscriminate and uncontrolled waste disposal
by parties who may or may not have known the potential future
hazards they were creating have disappeared. Today, the focus is
on locating the potentially responsible parties (PRPs), remedying
the unfortunate and excessively expensive realities of such reckless
abandon, and cleaning up thousands of toxic waste sites.
2
One of the most controversial issues related to toxic waste sites
concerns how PRPs and the Environmental Protection Agency
1. CHARLES DICKENS, OIVER TWIST 12 (Oxford University Press 1996) (1857).
2. See Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.
1986) (assessing cleanup costs of combined Superfund sites at over $250 million);
Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 1, 10 n.50 (1993)
(approximating average costs per site at $50 million); Lauren E. Passmore, Note,
Reintroducing Equal Treatment in the "Toxic" Litigation Arena: An Exploration of the
Factors Courts Utilize to Divide the Costs of Environmental Remediation, 79 CoNELL L.
REv. 1682, 1685 n.16 (1994) (estimating average cost of cleaning up Superfund
site at approximately $30 million and noting each hazardous waste site requires,
on average, 10 to 30 years to remediate); Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical
Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413,
10,415 (1991) (describing millions of dollars required for transactional costs in-
volved in establishing liability for site cleanups).
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) broadly defines potentially responsible parties (PRPs) as
follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance.
CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
(73)
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(EPA) should pay for the cleanups. More specifically, EPA and
PRPs have had to address those portions of cleanups attributable to
other PRPs that are unable to pay due to insolvency or bankruptcy.
These portions of the cleanup costs are known as "orphan shares. ' 3
Although Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to gov-
ern issues directly related to past disposal of hazardous substances,
courts have been forced to address orphan share liability issues
where the language of CERCLA is unclear. 4 Not surprisingly, cir-
cuit courts often reach different conclusions when deciding similar
issues concerning orphan share liability.5
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze CERCLA liability
issues with a particular emphasis on orphan share liability and re-
form. Part II provides a brief summary of CERCLA's legislative and
historical background. 6 Part III presents an analysis of CERCLA lia-
bility issues with a broad overview of the case law as it has
progressed since the enactment of CERCLA.7 Part IV traces EPA's
response to CERCLA orphan share liability issues, including the ef-
3. See EPA's Interim Guidance on Orphan Share Compensation for Settlors of
Remedial Design/Remedial Action and Non-Time-Critical Removals, reprinted in
N.Y. LAwJ., at 54 (Oct. 15, 1996) [hereinafter Interim Guidance] (defining or-
phan share as "that share of responsibility which is specifically attributable to iden-
tified parties EPA has determined are: (1) potentially liable; (2) insolvent or
defunct; and (3) unaffiliated with any party potentially liable for response costs at
the site"); see also City & County of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340,
343 (D. Colo. 1993) (defining orphan shares as response costs attributable to
"bankrupt or financially insolvent PRPs"). Orphan shares do not include shares
attributed to "(1) unallocable waste; (2) the difference between a party's share and
its ability to pay; or (3) those parties, such as 'de micromis' contributors, municipal
solid waste (MSW) contributors or certain lenders or residential homeowners, that
EPA would not ordinarily pursue for cleanup costs." Interim Guidance, supra, at
54.
4. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution: Resolving the Contro-
versy Over CERCLA Claims Brought By Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARv. ENvrL.
L. REv. 83, 83 (1997) (noting controversy has occurred since some of CERCLA's
provisions are "unclear and seemingly contradictory"); see also Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM.J. ENVWL. L. 1, 2 (1982) (stating CERCLA
is a "hastily assembled bill" and its "fragmented legislative history add to the usual
difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law"). Notably, many originally
suggested CERCLA provisions were not included in the statute. See HAROLD C.
BARNETt, Toxic DEBTS AND THE SUPERFUND DILEMMA 59-67 (1994) (discussing such
provisions and various proposed bills that were not incorporated into CERCLA).
5. For a discussion on varying court decisions relating to orphan share liabil-
ity issues, see infra notes 28-67 and accompanying text.
6. For a brief discussion of CERCLA's legislative history and background, see
infta notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of CERCLA liability issues and a summary of case law as it
has progressed since the enactment of CERCLA, see infra notes 20-67 and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. IX: p. 73
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fect of the most recent reforms implemented by EPA.8 Finally, Part
V discusses the impact of EPA orphan share reforms on past and
potential future CERCLA legislation, and suggests that congres-
sional clarification is needed on specific liability and funding
issues.9
II. CERCLA: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1980, Congress reacted to growing public concern over the
environmental and health risks posed by past disposal of hazardous
substances by enacting CERCLA. 10 Congress's two main objectives
in passing CERCLA were to expedite site cleanups and to ensure
that those parties responsible for creating the risks, PRPs, pay for
8. For a discussion of EPA's response to orphan share liability issues and EPA
reforms, see infra notes 68-93 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the impact of EPA orphan share legislation, see infra
notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
10. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)); H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-20 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119 [hereinafter CERCLA HousE REPORT] (noting
purpose of CERCLA "to respond to releases of hazardous waste from inactive, haz-
ardous waste sites which endanger public health and the environment"). CERCLA
was enacted to supplement the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), which had been established to regulate the on-going handling and dispo-
sal of "hazardous waste." Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795-2839 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections at
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994)); see also Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazard-
ous Substance Cleanups Under CERCLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 65, 69 & n.10 (noting "Congress concluded that then-existing statutory au-
thorities were inadequate because they did not allow for an immediate and large-
scale response to the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites" and "Congress in-
tended to replace the 'patchwork' approach to cleanup derived from the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976"). CERCLA, however, regulates a larger
set of substances than RCRA, called "hazardous substances," which includes "haz-
ardous wastes." See CERCLA § 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1994).
Much of the growing public concern regarding the threats of uncontrolled
hazardous waste arose in 1978 from heightened public attention to the contamina-
tion of homes in areas such as the "Love Canal" area of Niagra Falls, N.Y., and the
"Valley of the Drums" in Kentucky. See CERCLA HousE REPORT, supra, at 6121
(reporting increases in miscarriages, recognizing New York State Health Depart-
ment was unable to assure adequate protection of resident's public health, and
indicating congressional findings of many dangerous health effects); 1 ALLAN J.
TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAw AND PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 3 (1992)
(describing thousands of leaking drums which tainted area groundwater used for
drinking in "Valley of the Drums"); Healy, supra, at 68-69 (discussing "well publi-
cized incidents of improper disposal of large amounts of hazardous substances
which caused serious public health problems"). Moreover, EPA studies performed
in the early eighties indicated that only 10% of waste was disposed in environmen-
tally safe manners. See CERCLA HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 6119.
1998]
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the cost of the cleanups.11 To further these objectives, Congress
required EPA12 to develop a list of priority cleanup sites, known as
the National Priority List, and provided an initial $1.6 billion trust
fund to facilitate the cleanups.13 This fund, from which CERCLA
derives its more commonly used name, "Superfund," was designed
to finance EPA's cleanup and enforcement costs, as well as eligible
11. See William W. Balcke, Note, Superfund Settlements: The Failed Promise of the
1986 Amendments, 74 VA. L. REv. 123, 123 & n.2 (1988) (citing 126 CONG. REC.
30,932 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph), reprinted in 1 SENATE COMM. ON ENVI-
RONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 9 7 TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF
1980 (SUPERFUND), at 685-86 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter CERCLA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY]; 126 CONG. REc. 31,951 (remarks of Rep. Florio), reprinted in CER-
CLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 777)); see also Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C.
Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 936 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating "CERCLA's dual goals are to en-
courage quick response and to place the cost of that response on those responsible
for the hazardous condition"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding "Congress intended that those respon-
sible for problems caused by the disposal ... bear the costs and the responsibility
for remedying the harmful conditions they created").
12. See, e.g., CERCLA §§ 104(a), 105(a), 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a),
9605(a), 9606(a) (1994) (authorizing "the President" to act). The President dele-
gated his CERCLA response authority to the EPA Administrator by executive or-
der. See Exec. Order No. 12,316, 3 C.F.R. 168 (1981), reprinted as amended in 42
U.S.C. § 9604 app. at 1430-31 (1994). Additionally, the President delegated pri-
mary authority to the EPA Administrator in 1987. See Exec. Order No. 12,580, 3
C.F.R. 193 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 9615 app. at 264-67 (1994).
13. See CERCLA § 105(a)(8) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (1994) (explain-
ing process of creating National Priorities List). The National Priorities List (NPL)
is "a published list of hazardous waste sites in the country that are eligible for
extensive, long-term cleanup under the Superfund program." This Is .Superfund
(visited Jan. 20, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/web/oerr/
sfguide/index2.html>; see also TOPOL & SNOW supra note 10, at 82 (describing NPL
original purpose as "quick and inexpensive method of identifying sites that war-
ranted further investigation under CERCLA"). EPA uses a Hazard Ranking System
to "accurately assess[ ] the relative degree of risk to human health and the environ-
ment posed by sites and facilities subject to review." See CERCLA § 105(c) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 9605(c) (1).
The initial NPL included 406 of the most dangerous hazardous sites, but was
expanded to approximately 1,500 by the middle of fiscal year 1997. See Superfund:
EPA - Claimed Improvements to CERCLA Misleading, Political Consulting Group Says,
Chem. Reg. Daily (BNA) (July 15, 1997) (stating "[tihirty percent of the total
number of sites on the National Priorities List - 419 sites - have reached EPA's
definition of 'construction complete' midway through fiscal 1997"). In 1992, when
the total number of sites on the NPL was 1,072, it was predicted that the number of
sites would grow by 100 each year. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 4 n.16 (1993)
(citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. B (1992); see also KATHERINE N. PROBST & PAUL R.
PORTNEY, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, ASSIGNING LIABILITY FOR SUPERFUND CLEAN-
ups: AN ANALYSIS OF POLICY ACTIONS 17 (1992)). Today, EPA lists 1,405 NPL sites,
and 498 total completed cleanups. See Administrative Reform Annual Report, Fiscal
Year 1997 (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/oerr/techres/
annrpt97.htm> [hereinafter Annual Report 19971.
[Vol. IX: p. 73
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claims of private parties.1 4 Superfund received its funds from taxes
imposed on the petroleum and chemical industries, from an envi-
ronmental tax on corporations, and from general tax revenue.15
Shortly after passing CERCLA, Congress enacted the National
Contingency Plan, which sets forth the procedures EPA is to follow
to determine which sites require cleanup. 16 Difficulties arising
from EPA's inability to accurately identify all PRPs and apportion
liability led to numerous arguments and varying litigation regard-
ing PRP liability. 17 Courts disagreed on the issue of whether CER-
14. See CERCLA § 111(a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1994) (reflecting that
private parties are permitted to recover "[p]ayment of any claim for necessary re-
sponse costs incurred by any other person"). Though the name appears in section
111(a) of CERCLA, the term "Superfund" finds its origins in a suggestion by a
group of large oil companies to create a fund to finance supertanker oil spills. See
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWs 4-1 (Wallis E. McClain, Jr. ed., 1994) (noting Congress
never accepted oil company superfund proposal, but adopted its concept in creat-
ing Superfund).
15. See CERCLA §§ 111-112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611-9612 (1994). Superfund has
been supported in part by appropriations received in Treasury under sections 59A,
4611, and 4661 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. See I.R.C. § 59A (1994)
(placing environmental tax on corporations); I.R.C. § 4611 (1994) (imposing tax
on crude oil and petroleum products); I.R.C. § 4661 (1994) (providing for tax on
various chemical products).
Superfund taxation has been described as a fair means of spreading the costs
of site cleanups since "taxpayers (individuals and corporations) benefit from the
services and products that generate toxic waste." The Continuing Predicament of Allo-
cating Orphan Shares In CERCLA Litigation, 8 Mealey's Lit. Rep. (Mealey Publica-
tions, Inc.) No. 18, at 1 (Dec. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Continuing Predicament]; see
also ToPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, at 9 (stating "[u]nder the original statute,
twelve oil and chemical companies paid seventy percent of the Superfund excise
tax"). Some courts have found, however, that Superfund taxation is unfair since
the costs of site cleanups should be borne by the parties responsible for creating
the hazards. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
Notably, the Clinton administration has not reauthorized Superfund taxing
authority to date. See Interim Guidance, supra note 3, at 54. For a further discus-
sion on reauthorization of Superfund taxation, see infra note 94 and accompany-
ing text.
16. See CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994). The National Contingency
Plan (NCP) was initially created as an oil spill response plan. See U.S. ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAwS, supra note 14, at 4-1 (noting oil spills "had aroused outrage and caused
tremendous environmental damage worldwide"). The NCP sets forth procedures
for the cleanup process which include a preliminary assessment of the site, a sim-
ple removal action to stabilize any immediately dangerous situations and poten-
tially, a full-blown site inspection if the simple removal action is inadequate. See
CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Additionally, the NCP includes requirements
which EPA can use in determining which sites have priority for cleanup. See id.
§ 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. EPA uses these priority determinations to rank sites by
priority on the NPL. See id. § 105, 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a) (8) (B). Since CERCLA does
not provide an opportunity for a hearing prior to the placement of a site on the
NPL, arguments of constitutional due process violations have been raised. See To-
POL & SNOW, supra note 10, at 82.
17. For a further discussion of varying views among the courts regarding PRP
liability under CERCLA, see infra notes 20-67 and accompanying text.
1998]
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CLA authorized the courts to impose joint and several liability on
PRPs without permitting such PRPs to sue other PRPs in contribu-
tion actions.18 In an attempt to prevent such litigation, Congress
extensively amended CERCLA in 1986 with the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), which provided PRPs with
the statutory right to contribution. 19 SARA, however, did not bring
an end to litigation concerning the right to bring a contribution
action.
III. SUPERFUND LIABILITY: RECOVERING THE COST OF CLEANUP
A. EPA Cleanup and Cost Recovery
EPA follows procedures prescribed in CERCLA in order to en-
sure that PRPs either reimburse the government for expenses in-
curred in the cleanup of toxic sites, or that the PRPs actually
perform the cleanup themselves. This is achieved through three
principal means. First, pursuant to CERCLA section 106(a), EPA
may compel PRPs who have been deemed responsible for the waste
sites to initiate and pay for the cleanups.20 Second, EPA may initi-
18. For a further discussion of PRP contribution actions under CERCLA, see
infra notes 24-43 and accompanying text.
19. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)) [hereinafter SARA] (noting in section 113(f) that "any person may seek
contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under sec-
tion 9607(a) of this title"); see alsoJason E. Panzer, Apportioning CERCLA Liability:
Cost Recovery or Contribution, Where Does a PRP Stand?, 7 FoPRDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 437,
450 (1996) (describing codification of statutory right of contribution).
The Executive delegated his authority under SARA to EPA. See Exec. Order
No. 12,580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1987). SARA also added section 122(a) which au-
thorized EPA to enter into agreements with private parties "[w] henever practicable
and in the public interest.., to facilitate agreements . . . that are in the public
interest . . . in order to expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litiga-
tion." CERCLA § 122(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1994). Some believe, however, that
the reforms provided by the enactment of SARA were ineffective. See Robert H.
Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REv. 265, 271 (stating that "a popular saying evolved that SARA had been
misnamed and that her name was really RACHEL, the Reauthorization Act Con-
firms How Everyone's Liable"). For a further discussion of SARA, see infra notes
44-46 and accompanying text.
20. See CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994) (granting government au-
thority to seek injunctive relief in United States district court, when it is deter-
mined that "there may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the
public health or welfare or the environment"). CERCLA grants the President au-
thority to issue "such orders as may be necessary to protect public health and wel-
fare and the environment" in the form of Administrative Orders issued by EPA
against parties deemed responsible. Id. Failure to comply with an Administrative
Order carries a penalty of up to $25,000 per day plus punitive damages. See id.
§§ 106(b) (1), 107(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b) (1), 9607(c)(3). Additionally, sec-
tion 107 provides for treble damages against parties who fail to comply with section
[Vol. IX: p. 73
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ate and finance the cleanup itself using Superfund dollars, and
then file suit under Superfund section 107 to recover the expenses
incurred. 21 Finally, EPA may entice PRPs to begin the cleanup by
entering into settlement agreements in which EPA grants PRPs re-
lief from future contribution actions in exchange for their promise
to take partial responsibility for the cost of the cleanup. 22 Congress
added CERCLA's settlement provisions in 1986 when it enacted
SARA in hopes of expediting cleanups.23
Under sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA, courts agree that
PRPs have the right to sue other PRPs. While all courts now agree
that a PRP may bring a contribution claim under section 113 of
CERCLA, not all courts permit such an action under section 107 of
CERCLA. 24 Section 107(a) specifies that any person liable under
106 Administrative Orders, if the government is forced to incur costs to perform
the cleanup. See id. § 107(c) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (3).
21. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). The language of section
107(a) provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section ... any person...
shall be liable for. . . all costs of removal or remedial action incurred...
[and] any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
... [and] damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural re-
sources . .. [and] the costs of any health assessment of health affects
study carried out ....
Id.
22. See CERCLA § 122, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a) (1994). The language of section
122(a) provides, in relevant part:
Authority To Enter Into Agreements.- The President, in his discretion,
may enter into an agreement with any person . . . to perform any re-
sponse action .... Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as
determined by the President, the President shall act to facilitate agree-
ments under this section that are in the public interest... in order to
expedite effective remedial actions and minimize litigation.
Id. Section 113(f) (2) of CERCLA immunizes PRPs from future contribution liabil-
ity with what has come to be known as a "contribution bar." The language of
section 113(f) (2) provides in relevant part:
Settlement. - A person who has resolved its liability to the United States
or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not
be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the
settlement.
CERCLA § 113(f) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). Such settlement amounts do not
relieve the responsibility of any other PRPs not parties to the settlement, but the
total liability at the site is reduced by the settlement amounts. See id.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 100 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2882 (stating SARA was enacted "to encourage and facilitate
negotiated private party cleanup of hazardous substances in those situations where
negotiations have a realistic chance of success").
24. See CERCLA §§ 107, 113, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 (1994) (providing for
federal and private party cost-recovery actions). For a partial reading of the liabil-
ity language of section 107, see supra note 21 and accompanying text. For a partial
reading of the liability language of section 113, see supra note 22 and accompany-
ing text.
1998]
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CERCLA "shall be liable for . . .any other necessary costs of re-
sponse incurred by any other person." 25 Section 113 permits liable
parties to seek contribution "from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable. '26 Depending upon the circuit in which a contri-
bution action is brought, a PRP, bringing a liability action against
another PRP, will face different restrictions on recovery. 27 More-
over, courts have differed when determining which party or parties
are responsible for the cost of the orphan shares. 28 To understand
how courts analyze CERCLA's PRP liability scheme today, a brief
history of the interpretation of liability under section 107 and
under section 113 follows.
B. Apportioning Liability Prior to SARA
Prior to SARA, EPA initiated liability cost recovery actions
against PRPs without identifying every party that could be held le-
gally liable for cleanup costs. In the early 1980's, EPA targeted
PRPs who were identifiable among often times inadequate and in-
complete site records.2 9 Even though the language of CERCLA did
not expressly permit PRPs to be held jointly and severally liable,
25. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B). The language of "any other per-
son" described in section 107(a) authorizes EPA and private parties to recover
from PRPs. See id. § 107(a) (4) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4)(B); see alsoAmoco Oil
Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing section 107 au-
thority for "both government and private parties"). For a further discussion on
divergent court decisions involving CERC[A liability before and after the enact-
ment of SARA, see infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text.
26. CERCLA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994); see also United Tech. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1994) (describing right to
"seek contribution from other potentially liable parties").
27. Restrictions on recovery stem from past decisions at common law, as well
as more recent court decisions that vary in interpreting the Superfund provisions
since the enactment of SARA. For a further discussion of restrictions on recovery,
see infra notes 29-67 and accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of court decisions involving responsibility for or-
phan share liability, see infra notes 31-67 and accompanying text.
29. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1205 (2d Cir. 1992) (sug-
gesting that EPA routinely brings actions against those PRPs with greatest ability to
pay); United States v. Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930, 938 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (stating "joint'and several liability allows the government to sue a managea-
ble number of parties and to collect the entire amount of response costs from
those defendants"); BARNE-T, supra note 4, at 178. This liability scheme is permit-
ted, however, under the rationale that strict liability is "both fair and efficient"
since it acts as a "means of encouraging the development of safer waste disposal
techniques." See Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1458, 1520 (1986) [hereinafter Toxic Waste Litigation].
[Vol. IX: p. 73
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EPA filed suits against individual PRPs and attempted to hold PRPs
jointly and severally liable under section 107.30
As a result, PRPs that had been sued by EPA argued that such
suits were unfair unless these PRPs were given the right to seek re-
imbursement from other PRPs who had not been targeted. Never-
theless, some courts read the language of section 107 to permit
courts to impose joint and several liability, and refused to permit
PRPs to argue for an implied right of contribution. 31 However, this
practice was not consistent among all jurisdictions. Other courts
found the language of CERCLA to be vague, and thus permitted
PRPs the right of contribution under section 107.32 Those courts
30. The common law rationale for joint and several liability finds its origins in
Summers v. Tice. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). The California Supreme Court in Summers
stated that the "real reason for the rule that each joint tortfeasor is responsible for
the whole damage is the practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress
simply because he cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is certain
that between them they did all." Id. at 3 (quoting 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, SELECT
CASES ON THE LAw OF TORTS app. B § 153 (1991)). This original rationale, there-
fore, stems from a burden of proof issue, where the plaintiff was unable to prove
the exact amount of damage caused by each defendant. See generally Gregory C.
Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutoiy Modification ofJoint and Several Liability: Resisting the
Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1 (1992).
31. See, e.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985);
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 1984).
Even after the enactment of SARA, some courts continued to reference the
pre-SARA refusal to consider contribution actions under section 107. See, e.g.,
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167-71 (4th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1308-09 (E.D. Mo. 1987); United States v. New Castle
County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (D. Del. 1986).
32. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (describing section 107 as "vague and its legislative history indefinite");
GRAD, supra note 4, at 2 (stating "[flaced with a complicated bill on a take it-or-
leave it basis, the House took [CERCLA], groaning all the way"); Standing Under
Superfund §§ 107 and 113: Avoiding the Error of the Blind Man and the Elephant, 10
Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 155, 157 (July 12, 1995) [hereinafter Standing Under
Superfund] (noting "on the eve of the enactment of SARA in 1986, it was more or
less non-controversial that liable parties had a right of contribution under §107,
but it remained unclear whether they could seek joint and several liability"); see also
Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D.
Cal. 1984) (stating section 107 "clearly" authorized "private cause of action");
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding
plaintiff party had right to bring section 107 CERCLA liability action against de-
fendant parties responsible for portion of cleanup costs).
The Chem-Dyne court and other courts recognized the need for such section
107 actions because the cleanup costs for a particular site often fell upon only a
small number of the parties responsible for the costs. The Chem-Dyne court deter-
mined that section 433 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts differentiated be-
tween joint and several liability and several liability, and was the first court to
address joint and several liability under CERCLA. See generally Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp. 802 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (1979)). Notably, the
Energy and Commerce Committee later recognized the Chem-Dyne court's "estab-
lish [ment of ] a uniform federal rule for using joint and several liability." H.R.
REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
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applied common law principles or recognized an implied right of
contribution among PRPs in CERCLA controversies.3 3
33. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2856 (noting that since joint and several liability was not part of express language
of CERCLA prior to SARA, courts were forced to "establish the scope of liability
through a case-by-case application of 'traditional and evolving principles of com-
mon law' and pre-existing statutory law"); Standing Under Superfund, supra note 32,
at 157; see also Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985) (stating
"Congress intended issues of liability, including joint and several liability and con-
tribution, to be determined under traditional and evolving principles of Federal
common law" (citing Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808-10)); United States v. Conser-
vation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 224 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating "it is inequitable
to require one to pay the entire cost of reparation, and it is sound policy to deter
all wrongdoers by reducing the likelihood that any will entirely escape liability,"
while recognizing CERCLA implicitly encompassed right of contribution from leg-
islative history and CERCLA's purpose, not from common law).
An implied right of contribution permits PRPs who have paid more than their
equitable share to sue other PRPs to recoup these costs. See Richard D. Buckley,
Jr., Making a Case for Statutory Amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA "): Solving the Section 107/Section 113 Cause of
Action Controversy, 31 TULSA L.J. 851, 856 (1996). Courts handled the contribution
apportionment of liability under this rationale by following the "global allocation"
method of section 886A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), (3), and (4), when two or more
persons become liable in tort to the same person for the same harm,
there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has
not been recovered against all or any of them.
(2) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has
discharged the entire claim for the harm by paying more than his equita-
ble share of the common liability, and is limited to the amount paid by
him in excess of his share. No tortfeasor can be required to make a con-
tribution beyond his own equitable share of the liability.
(3) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally caused the harm.
(4) When one tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another,
neither of them has a right of contribution against the other.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(2) (1979). For an additional discussion
of the "global allocation" method, see infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text.
Additionally, some courts relied upon the rationale of section 433A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts which provides:
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes
where
(a) there are distinct harms, or
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of
each cause to a single harm.
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or
more causes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 443A (1979). For a listing of courts that fol-
lowed this rationale, see Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 29, at 1527 n.82. Other
courts relied upon the rationale of section 881 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which provides:
If two or more persons, acting independently, tortiously cause distinct
harms or a single harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division
according to the contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for
the portion of the total harm that he has himself caused.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 881 (1979).
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Some courts that permitted section 107 contribution actions
divided the trials into two phases, namely, a liability phase and a
cost allocation phase. During the liability phase, plaintiff PRPs
could sue defendant PRPs for cost recovery under section 107.34
During the cost allocation phase of these trials, courts would hold
defendant PRPs jointly and severally liable unless one or more de-
fendants demonstrated that the total contamination at a site was
divisible and each defendant's contribution to the damage could be
assessed individually. 35 If a defendant succeeded in making this
showing, these courts would then apportion the damages based on
a global allocation. 36
The global allocation rationale was first approved by a district
court in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Peck Iron &
Metal Co.3 7  In Chesapeake & Potomac, the Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Company of Virginia (C&P) commenced a hazardous
waste cleanup pursuant to an EPA administrative order.3 8 C&P
34. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (B) (1994) (stating "any [re-
sponsible] person ... shall be liable for ... any other necessary costs of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan") (em-
phasis added); see also Standing Under Superfund, supra note 32, at 157.
35. See In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 993 F.2d 915, 921 & n.4 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating "[1]iability under § 107(a) is joint and several unless a defendant
carries the 'especially heavy burden' of showing that liability is divisible, i.e., that
there is a reasonable basis for apportioning the harm"); see also United States v.
Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1989) (permitting joint and several liability
in cases of indivisible harm); but see United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
Supp. 1249, 1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding when defendant is unable to prove his
contribution to injury, joint and several liability will not be used since court has
discretion to apportion damages using other factors). Notably, the PRP that brings
the contribution suit has the burden of proof to establish the proportional alloca-
tion of the costs. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (III), at 19 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042. The joint and several liability apportionment was first
applied in a CERCLA action in Chem-Dyne. See generally 572 F. Supp. 802. For an
additional discussion of Chem-Dyne, see supra notes 32-33.
36. See generally Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia v. Peck
Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1982). For a further discussion of
Chesapeake & Potomac, see infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
The equitable global allocation methodology described in section 886A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts established the guidelines for cost allocation. See
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS section 886A (1979). For a reading of the rele-
vant language of section 886A, see supra note 33. For a summary of the legislative
history of CERCLA joint and several liability issues, see David J. Engel, Note, Joint
and Several Liability Under Superfund: The Plight of the Small Volume Hazardous Waste
Contributor, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 1057, 1065-70 (1985).
37. 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1982).
38. See id. at 1272 (noting EPA's Administrative Order to C&P and 16 other
PRPs held all parties jointly and severally responsible). The remedial costs in-
curred by C&P exceeded $350 thousand. See id. at 1273. For a discussion of EPA's
authority to issue an administrative order under CERCLA, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
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then filed a cost recovery action under section 107 against 139
other PRPs, alleging that these parties were jointly and severally lia-
ble to C&P for all response costs incurred in cleaning up the site.39
The district court held that C&P was entitled to bring a section
107 action.40 In dividing the cleanup costs among PRPs, the court
imposed joint and several liability on the defendants only for the
response costs attributable to the defendants as a group.41 In the
interest of fairness, however, the court refused to attribute any of
the orphan share costs to the defendants at this phase of the trial.42
Instead, an equitable orphan share allocation among the plaintiff
and the defendants was made during the later cost allocation
phase.43
C. Apportioning Liability After SARA
Congress responded to the differences among pre-SARAjudi-
cial decisions and the growing backlog of CERCLA litigation by en-
acting SARA in 1986. SARA represented a congressional effort to
codify the common law implied right of contribution. 44 With the
passage of SARA, Congress also attempted to improve settlement
procedures by providing settling parties protection against contri-
39. See id. at 1273, 1280.
40. See id. at 1277 (stating "[n]othing in the language of... [CERCLA] pre-
cludes a party, like C&P, itself liable under CERCLA, to initiate cleanup and sue to
recover its costs under Section 107"). The court looked to the legislative history of
CERCLA and determined that the language "any other person" was not limited to
innocent persons. See id.
41. See id. at 1278 & n.9 (noting court imposed joint and several liability be-
cause damages are "indivisible"). In making its determination, the court in Chesa-
peake & Potomac relied upon the test in section 433A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. For a reading of the relevant language of section 433A, see supra note 33.
42. See Chesapeake & Potomac, 814 F. Supp. at 1278.
43. See id. In dicta, the court stated that it would determine the plaintiff's and
defendant's share first in apportioning liability. See id. The plaintiff would then
be liable for only its share of costs and the portion of the orphan share the court
determined during the [cost allocation] phase. See id. This rationale enabled the
court to "rule[ ] .. .in advance of the [cost allocation] phase of the lawsuit, that
the [p]laintiff will not be allowed to recover those costs attributable to its own
dumping or the orphan shares allocated to it by the [c]ourt." Id.
44. See CERCLA HousE REPORT, supra note 10, at 62 (statement of Albert
Gore, Jr. (noting that a "main goal of the [Superfund] legislation originally was to
clarify and codify long-standing common law theories as they relate to liability for
damages caused by hazardous waste disposal activities")). Prior to the passage of
SARA, Representative John D. Dingell (D-Mich.) stated, "[niothing in this legisla-
tion is intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule ofjoint and
several liability enunciated in the Chem-Dyne case and followed by a number of
other federal courts." U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAws, supra note 14, at 4-2 (citing
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802). For a definition of the right of
contribution, see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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bution actions by non-settling parties. 45 Unfortunately, the lan-
guage of SARA was vague, and continued to cause varying decisions
among the courts. These varying decisions mainly involved a de-
bate over a private party's right to sue for contribution under sec-
tion 107 rather than section 113.46
Under section 113, courts have held that liability is several,
rather than joint and several. Conversely, liability under section
107 is joint and several for harms that are not shown to be divisible.
Therefore, a more controversial issue concerns the cost allocation
of orphan shares, since some courts have not been in agreement
with regard to the issue of defendant liability for the orphan share.
For example, after the enactment of SARA, some courts continued
to apply the common law global allocation scheme to cost alloca-
tion efforts. A similar rationale was followed by the district court in
Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co.47 In Charter
Township of Oshtemo, the plaintiff argued that it should not be re-
sponsible for any portion of the orphan share, because a contrary
holding would be a disincentive for a PRP to initiate a cleanup. 48
The court refused to assign the orphan share solely to the defend-
ants under that rationale, but instead held that orphan shares must
be apportioned equitably among all solvent parties. 49 Nevertheless,
45. See CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1994). For a reading of the lan-
guage of section 113(f), see supra note 19. Additionally, Congress also intended to
promote settlements by shielding settling parties from government suits by issuing
'covenants not to sue." See id. § 122(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f) (providing "[t]he Pres-
ident may, in his discretion, provide any person with a covenant not to sue con-
cerning any liability to the United States under this Act, including future liability").
46. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253 (I), at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3042 (noting that courts in favor of right to section 107 actions hold that
legislative history of section 113 implies that addition of section 113 does not limit
party's right of action under section 107). For a discussion of the differences be-
tween a section 107 and a section 113 action, see William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose
and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NoTRE DAME L.
REv. 193, 206 (stating "[flor a variety of reasons dealing with either the statutory
scheme or the nature of contribution actions as interpreted by the courts, the right
to contribution is somewhat limited").
47. 898 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
48. See id. at 508. The plaintiff argued that allocating any portion of an or-
phan share would substantially lessen the incentive for PRPs to participate in a site
cleanup. See id. at 509. Moreover, PRPs would have no incentive to initiate clean-
ups "because they would not have the ability to seek equitable contribution toward
the orphan share from recalcitrant [potentially responsible parties] which are
found liable under section 113." Both Direct Defendants and Third-Party Defendants
Liable for CERCLA Orphan Shares, 4 Pa. Envtl. Compl. Update (M. Lee Smith Pub-
lishers LLC) No. 4, at 2 (May 1997) (citing United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp.
592 (D.N.J. 1997)).
49. See id. at 509 (agreeing with holding in Chesapeake & Potomac). For a dis-
cussion of the holding in Chesapeake & Potomac, see supra notes 37-43 and accompa-
nying text. Additionally, the court in Charter Township of Oshtemo stated that
1998]
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the district court stated that it would not be unfair to benefit the
first PRP who brings the action by allowing the first PRP to control
the cleanup. 50
Likewise, in United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chemicals, Inc., the
court applied the global allocation scheme, but did so under a dif-
ferent rationale.51 Atlas Minerals involved both an EPA enforce-
ment action and a third party contribution claim.52 At the time the
action was initiated, the total remediation costs were unknown and
undeterminable. 53 As a result, the court deferred orphan share de-
termination until after future costs were "actually incurred and
proven to be uncollectible." 54 The court indicated, however, that a
global allocation scheme should be used in future share computa-
tions. 55 In making its decision, the court relied on section 2(d) of
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) to support the global
allocation rationale.5 6
Other courts have taken a different approach to these liability
issues by allowing defendants to avoid responsibility for orphan
shares in section 113(f) contribution actions. Most notably, in
Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Service, the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania held that each party was responsible
exposure to orphan share liability was not necessarily a disincentive to participate
in a site cleanup. See id. at 508.
50. See id. at 508. Although the court agreed that it would be unfair for a
plaintiff to benefit from his wrongdoing, the court noted that the benefit to a PRP
that takes part in the cleanup would be the ability to control the cleanup at the
site. See id. at 508-09.
51. No. Civ. A. 91-5118, 1995 WL 510304 (E.D. Pa., Aug. 22, 1995).
52. See id. at *1.
53. See id. at *84.
54. See id. at *75.
55. See id. at *82.
56. See generally id. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UFCA) provides in
part:
Upon motion made not later than one year afterjudgment is entered, the
court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of
the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at
fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. The party whose
liability is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any
continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACr § 2(d) (amended 1977), 12 U.L.A. 136 (1996);
see also Atlas Minerals, 1995 WL 510304, at *82 (indicating that under the UFCA
approach, liability of third-party defendant PRPs would be reduced by the third-
party defendant settler's proportional or equitable share). The court further
stated that each PRP that did not settle would be responsible for "its proportionate
share." Id. at *83.
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only for its proportionate share of harm caused at the waste site. 57
The court concluded that since liability under section 113 is several,
not joint and several, it would be inequitable to hold defendants
liable for orphan shares when the plaintiff had established the ex-
act amount of harm caused by each defendant.58 This rationale left
the plaintiff fully responsible for the orphan share.
In an attempt to prevent the full burden of the orphan share
from falling on the plaintiff, some courts have applied yet another
approach known as a "de minimis settlement model." This model
was introduced in City and County of Denver v. Adolph Coors Co. where
the court approved a settlement agreement for 24 million dollars
that involved 119 PRPs.59 The settling parties in Adolph Coors fell
into four categories based on criteria required in CERC[A, which
determined their level of liability.60 Under the settlement proposal,
a portion of the orphan shares would be paid by those settlers who
had very little overall potential liability, "de minimis settlers."61 The
de minimis settlements in Adolph Coors incorporated an overall or-
phan share of approximately twenty percent of the cost of the
cleanup. 62 To encourage settlement, early de minimis settlement
proposals offered an orphan share of five percent; later settlements
57. 901 F. Supp. 906, 913 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding defendants in section 113
action are not responsible for orphan shares); see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
754 F. Supp. 960, 973 (D. Conn. 1991) (reasoning defendants' liability should be
limited to "the extent of their contribution to the problem").
58. See Gould, 901 F. Supp. at 913 (refusing to allow downward shift of orphan
shares to defendants, thereby leaving orphan share responsibility to plaintiff).
59. 829 F. Supp. 340 (D. Colo. 1993) (noting plaintiffs also moved for order
"barring claims against the settlers for contribution or response costs, except as
provided for in the settlement agreements... [and) declaring that the nonsettler's
share of liability is reduced by the amount paid by the settlers for their volumetric
share of the remedial costs at the site").
60. See id. These levels included: (1) de minimis settlements of one defend-
ant and many non-parties; (2) mid-tier settlements; (3) high-tier settlements; and
(4) settlements not based upon a volumetric waste formula, including settlements
based on a party's inability to pay or other unique circumstances affecting a party's
legal liability. See CERCLA § 122(g)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 122(g) (5) (1994).
61. See Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. at 342. Under the settlement agree-
ment, a de minimis PRP had to meet four criteria: (1) the PRP's section 104(e)
response was adequate and complete; (2) the PRP's volumetric contribution of
waste was below a certain level (300,000 gallons or less); (3) the PRP was not a
party to any other litigation against EPA related to the site; and (4) the PRP's waste
stream at the landfill was not significantly more toxic or hazardous than other
waste streams. See id. In approving the settlement, the court noted that the settle-
ment reflected a portion of response costs attributable to bankrupt or financially
insolvent PRPs. See id. at 343.
62. See id.
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mandated a thirty percent volumetric orphan share.63 This settle-
ment model shifted the orphan share liability from the plaintiff to
the defendant in a more equitable scheme.
Despite these differences in various courts' rationales, most
courts have held that the legislative history of section 113 implies
that the addition of section 113 does not limit a party's right of
action under section 107.64 However, as discussed above, other
courts do not agree. 65 The impact of these decisional splits is that
plaintiffs bringing a contribution suit under section 113 may only
be able to shift to the defendants the share of the liability that the
defendant contributed. As such, these plaintiffs could find them-
selves responsible for all of the orphan share liability. In contrast,
plaintiffs who sue under section 107 may be able to shift orphan
share liability to the defendants. 66 Additionally, courts that limit or
deny section 107 private party actions refuse to recognize the statu-
tory contribution protection afforded defendant PRPs who settle
their liability with the federal government through EPA. As a re-
sult, these jurisdictional splits also reflect that a court may base its
63. See id. This rationale was supported by the assumption that many de
minimis PRPs will agree to pay a portion of the orphan share to "achieve greater
finality in the liability associated with Site litigation." See id.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985). Courts following the reasoning
that makes the plaintiff pay for the orphan shares, arguably do not comport with
the CERCLA drafters' original intent of making PRPs pay their share of the dam-
ages. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting Congress intended CERCLA would assess costs and
responsibility for remedying harmful conditions on PRPs).
Courts have also concluded that permitting PRPs to bring section 107 actions
encourage PRPs to pay for cleanup costs under the assumption that they can re-
cover the costs incurred in the remediation. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 822 F. Supp. 545, 552 (N.D. Ind. 1992); O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706,
725-26 (D.R.I. 1988); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1142-43 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (reflecting reading of congressional intent to facilitate
cleanup).
65. See Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 868 F. Supp. 1212, 1215
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (stating PRP allowed to sue under section 107 had no real incen-
tive to clean up site since third party defendant could counterclaim for contribu-
tion); see also Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. at 346; United States v. ASARCO,
Inc., 814 F. Supp. 951,956-57 (D. Colo. 1993); Avnet, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 825
F. Supp. 1132, 1138-39 (D.R.I. 1992); Dravo Corp. v. Zuber, 804 F. Supp. 1182,
1189 (D. Neb. 1992), affd, 13 F.3d 1222 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kramer,
757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991).
66. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400 (D.
Ariz. 1996) (holding plaintiff had right to bring CERCLA section 107 cost recovery
action against defendants for all response costs arising from site cleanup). The
Pinal Creek court noted that "[t]he resolution of this issue will have a significant
impact on this litigation. Under Section 107, liability is joint and several, the range
of defenses is sharply limited, and the statute of limitations is six years. In contrast,
under Section 113(f), liability is severable only, an array of equitable defenses are
permitted, and the limitations period is three years." Id. at 1403.
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decisions on its interpretation of CERCLA's overall purpose or pol-
icy, as opposed to its legislative history.67
IV. EPA RESPONSE TO THE LIABILITY CoNFLIcTs
Because PRPs continue to bring section 107 and section 113 (f)
actions, EPA has initiated various reforms in an attempt to halt fu-
ture litigation. In an effort to enhance Superfund reform, EPA an-
nounced a series of new Superfund policies designed to: (1) reduce
litigation; (2) limit attorneys' fees; and (3) increase community par-
ticipation in the toxic waste cleanup process. EPA's goal in creating
these reforms was to encourage PRPs to agree to perform cleanups,
to negotiate settlements and to enhance the fairness of
settlements.68
A. EPA Pilot Superfund Cost Allocation Program
In response to conflicting decisions concerning cost allocation
in Superfund cleanups, as well as the resulting extreme backlog of
litigation, EPA launched a Superfund Administrative Reform Initia-
tive in February 1995.69 EPA modeled the program after a pro-
67. See ARAIZA, supra note 46, at 226-27. Some courts permitted plaintiffs to
sue under section 107 based on a "cleanup goal" which assumed that section 107's
liability scheme would encourage PRPs to perform cleanups because it favored
plaintiffs. See id. Other courts have cited the "settlement goal," which prohibited
PRPs from bringing cost recovery actions disguised as contribution suits. See id.
68. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 29, at 1505 (noting "[s]ettlements
may thus result in more expeditious resolution of pressing environmental
problems with concomitant reductions both in EPA's aggregate costs of litigation
and in the need to finance cleanups through the [Super]Fund"). Today, due to
current conflicting court decisions with regard to the section 113 and section 107
conflict, the absence of settlements could leave PRPs liable for the entire cost of
the cleanup, including the orphan share. For a further discussion of EPA's goals
in announcing reform measures, see infra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
69. See EPA Begins Pilot Superfund Cost Allocation Prject, Pa. Envtl. Compl. Up-
date (M. Lee Smith Publishers & Printers LLC) No. 7, at 1; (July 1995) [hereinaf-
ter Pilot Beginning]; Superfund: Hundreds of Small Parties Released From Enforcement
Under Agency Reforms, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA), 2196 (March 22, 1996) (noting that this
Superfund reform initiative was the second round of Superfund Administrative
Improvements, with first round of reforms initiated in June 1993); see also Annual
Report 1997, supra note 13 (noting that "[t] he first round of Superfund Administra-
tive Improvements, introduced in June 1993 ... focused heavily on speeding up
site investigation and construction completion activities . . . [while t] he second
round of reforms was an effort to administratively test or implement many of the
innovations contained in the proposal through pilot projects as well as new or
revised Agency guidance"). EPA later introduced a third round of Superfund re-
forms in October 1995, that was "designed to make cost-effective cleanup choices
that protect public health and the environment, reduce litigation and transac-
tional costs, and insure that states and communities are more informed and in-
volved in cleanup decisions." Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 4. This third
round of Superfund reforms included orphan share reform initiatives and gui-
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posed allocation process that had been introduced before the
United States House of Representatives in the Superfund Reform
Act of 1994.70 A pilot program set up by EPA was designed to use a
form of alternative dispute resolution to assign shares of responsi-
bility among all PRPs at a site.71 Most significantly, EPA announced
that it hoped to pay for all of the orphan shares in these pilot
programs. 72
1. EPA Pilot Program Process
EPA initially invited over 500 PRPs to participate in pilot pro-
grams at limited sites.73 EPA used its authority under CERCLA sec-
tion 104(e) to gather information in order to create preliminary
dance. See id. at 41. For a discussion of EPA reform measures undertaken in the
1980s, see Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 29 at 1505-10.
70. See Superfund Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 4916, 103d Cong. (1994) Annual
Report 1997, supra note 13, at 3.
71. See Pilot Beginning, supra note 69, at 1 (noting purpose of program is "to
allow PRPs to avoid time-consuming and costly CERCLA cost recovery and contri-
bution actions by using this alternative method of cost allocation"). For a discus-
sion of EPA's use of alternative dispute resolution, see EPA, Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Enforcement Actions, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 301 (June 2, 1995).
72. See id. EPA was concerned with the potential costs related to allocation
pilots, and noted that total orphan funding might not be possible if the total
number of pilot projects requiring federal funding was too high. See Superfund:
Regional Officials Asked to Evaluate EPA's Proposed Administrative Initiatives, 25 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2034 (Feb. 24, 1995) (statement of Bruce M. Diamond, Director,
EPA's Office of Site Remediation Enforcement). Notably, EPA announced in May
1995 that the pilot program had to be limited to a small number of sites since EPA
had "not received additional appropriations [that] year to pay the orphan share."
Superfund Administrative Reforms Fact Sheet: May 25, 1995, Allocation Pilots, 26 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 292 (June 2, 1995). For a further discussion of EPA allocation pilots,
see infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
73. See Superfund: Hundreds of Small Parties Released From Enforcement Under
Agency Reforms, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2196 (March 22, 1996) (citing Superfund Ad-
ministrative Reforms Semiannual Report, Fiscal Year 1995 (visitedJan. 20, 1997) <http:/
/www.epa.gov/superfund/oerr/techres/annrpt97.htm>). A legislative proposal
by Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) and Representative Thomas Bliley (R-
Va.), chairman of the House Commerce Committee, considered during the 103d
Congress contained an allocation process similar to that used with the EPA alloca-
tion pilot programs. See id. EPA initially selected five sites for these pilot pro-
grams in 1995. EPA increased its pilot program offer to a total of twelve sites, but
three sites did not accept the offer. See Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 58.
The original five sites included: Old Southington Landfill in Southington, Con-
necticut; NL Industries site in Pedricktown (Salem County), New Jersey; Hunter-
stown Road in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania; C&R Battery site in Chesterfield County,
Virginia; and Hastings Ground Water Contamination/North Landfill subsite in
Hastings, Nebraska. See Superfund: Five Sites Chosen by Agency to Test Liability Alloca-
tion Based on Reform Bill, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 251 (May 26, 1995) (noting that
orphan shares would be paid by EPA at these sites and "[t] he allocation approach
to be taken at the pilot sites differs from the traditional approach taken by EPA in
that, under the standard approach, the agency would generally pursue one PRP,
making it responsible for cleaning up the entire site. That party would then liti-
[Vol. IX: p. 723
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lists of PRPs eligible for the pilot program at each site.74 Upon no-
tification, EPA provided PRPs with the opportunity to "nominate"
other parties for inclusion on the list.75 After its review of the nomi-
nations, EPA issued a final list of parties, "allocation parties," that
would be eligible to participate. 76 Next, EPA, in conjunction with
allocation parties, nominated a neutral, non-governmental third
party to be the "allocator" for each site. 77
EPA then assigned to each allocator the responsibility of writ-
ing a report specifying the shares of responsibility for each of the
allocation parties. 78 EPA afforded substantial discretion to the allo-
cator to create allocation reports, and permitted allocation parties
to review a draft of the report and state their positions on the rec-
gate to recover its costs from other parties to the site"). Today, the pilot programs
at the nine sites are at various stages. See Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 58.
74. See Pilot Beginning, supra note 69, at 2 (noting EPA's plans to identify par-
ties eligible for de minimis settlements under CERCLA section 122(g), who would
not be part of allocation process if settlements were made). EPA chose the pilot
sites to represent a large range of site types based on: (1) the number of PRPs; (2)
the type of contamination present at the site; (3) the size of the orphan share; and
(4) the cleanup costs potentially involved. See Superfund: Five Sites Chosen By Agency
To Test Liability Allocation Based on Reform Bill supra note 73, at 251.
75. See Pilot Beginning, supra note 69, at 1 (noting also that each nomination
had to "include (1) a statement demonstrating that an adequate basis exists to
establish that the nominated party is liable under CERCLA, and (2) full disclosure
of all information concerning the nominated party's liability").
76. See id. This list included "those parties that will be subject to the alloca-
tion process; the EPA, on behalf of the orphan share; and non-settling de mimimis
parties, municipal solid waste generators/transporters, and ability-to-pay parties."
Id.
77. See id. Each party on the allocation list was able to vote for the allocator
on a per-capita basis, with EPA voting for each insolvent and defunct party, and
retaining veto power for any allocator not nominated by EPA. See id.
78. See id. These allocation reports included the shares attributable to the
orphan share. See id. Any share that was not attributable to a specific party was
included in the allocated shares. See id. The allocations created by the allocators
were to be based on the following factors:
(1) the amount of hazardous substances involved;
(2) the degree of toxicity of hazardous substances contributed by alloca-
tion parties;
(3) the mobility of hazardous substances contributed by allocation
parties;
(4) the degree of involvement by allocation parties in the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of the substances;
(5) the degree of care exercised by the allocation parties with respect to
the substances involved; and
(6) the degree of cooperation of the allocation parties with government
officials to prevent any harm to public health or the environment.
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ommended allocations. 79 Lastly, EPA used the allocator's final re-
port for settlement discussions with the allocation parties.80
2. Outcome of the EPA Pilot Programs
According to EPA, the reforms initiated by the pilot programs
have resulted in significant cost savings in the cleanup process.8'
Additionally, EPA highlighted that more than seventy percent of
long-term cleanup actions were financed by PRPs as a result of
these settlements. 82 Among the twelve pilot program sites, three
refused the pilot program offer, three had allocator issued reports
"reflecting an agreement regarding the shares of responsibility be-
tween the parties," one had "a majority of parties settle[ ]" and the
remaining five are in the preliminary phases of the allocation pro-
cess.83 These positive results have prompted EPA to initiate addi-
tional reforms in a continuing effort to reduce future litigation, to
significantly cut costs and to induce PRPs to perform cleanups.
B. Recent EPA Reform for Orphan Share Liability Issues
To further develop orphan share reform, EPA announced in
October 1995 that it would provide orphan share compensation at
79. See Pilot Beginning, supra note 69, at 2. EPA assisted the allocator in the
information-gathering process and also had authority to reject the final report on
several limited grounds. See id.
80. See id. Settlements were described as "cash-out settlements, where a PRP is
required only to pay money to the agency, or cleanup settlements, where the PRP
is required to conduct site cleanup activities." Id. PRPs required to perform
cleanup activities were reimbursed by EPA for costs exceeding their allocation
share. See id.
81. See Superfund: Reports Cite Savings in Remedy Selection Resulting from
Superfund Reforms at EPA, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1874 (Jan. 10, 1997) (citing
Superfund Administrative Reforms Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1996 (visited Jan. 20,
1997) <http://www.epa.gov/oeerrpate/superfnd/web/oerr/sfguide/index2.htm>
[hereinafter Annual Report 1996] (noting EPA "has taken a number of steps to
ensure that federal superfund resources and projections are focused in the right
places")); Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 58 (noting "a number of companies
believed the actual costs expended were less than [potential costs of] litigation").
Alternatively, some small companies "felt the process was not cost effective for
them." Id. at 59. Significantly, EPA observed that "[p] rivate parties agreed to par-
ticipate in the pilot because: EPA was funding 100 percent of the orphan share;
parties believed the process would be more cost efficient than current Superfund
litigation; and the party could enter into a fair share settlement." Id.
82. See Superfund: Reports Cite Savings in Remedy Selection Resulting from
Superfund Reforms at EPA, supra note 81, at 1874 (reflecting that "parties that bear
the larger burden of responsibility at superfund sites also have benefitted from the
reforms").
83. See Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 58. EPA has stated that "the pi-
lots have been useful in identifying problems and have indicated the need for
flexibility to meet site-specific circumstances." See Annual Report 1996, supra note
81.
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additional sites where PRPs agreed to perform cleanups.84 At the
time of this announcement, EPA also requested that Congress re-
form CERCLA to achieve three main goals: (1) to ensure that pol-
luters, not taxpayers, pay for cleanup costs; (2) to speed up site
cleanups while reducing transaction costs; and (3) to enable local
communities to maintain a larger role in selecting cleanup plans.85
EPA subsequently issued an "Interim Guidance" on orphan share
compensation on June 3, 1996.86 The Interim Guidance an-
nounced EPA's intention to "fundamentally change the way EPA
implements the Superfund program" by paying for some of the or-
phan share.87 EPA anticipated that its Interim Guidance would
help facilitate and encourage settlements with PRPs.88 To help ex-
pedite the reforms enumerated in the Interim Guidance, EPA es-
tablished an orphan share assistance team with the Department of
Justice. 89
84. See Continuing Predicament, supra note 15, at 2 (noting EPA's announce-
ment to fund portion of orphan share costs was made to reduce litigation costs, to
accelerate cleanups and to ensure fairer allocation of cleanup costs).
85. See Continuing Predicament, supra note 15, at 1 (noting that EPA Adminis-
trator Carol M. Browner's "20 new common sense administrative reforms to the
EPA toxic waste cleanup program [were] . .. intended: (1) to make cost-effective
cleanup choices that protect the environmental and public health; (2) to reduce
litigation and its associated costs so that more time could be spent on cleanup; and
(3) to help communities become more knowledgeable and involved so that
cleanup decisions make more sense at the local level").
86. See Interim Guidance, supra note 3, at 54. EPA released the Interim Gui-
dance to "provide[ ] Regions with further direction to address orphan share com-
pensation in Superfund settlements . . . [and to] strike[ ] a balance between the
budgetary constraints of a lapse in Superfund taxing authority and the desire to
provide meaningful reform .... " Id.
87. Id. The Interim Guidance states that the Superfund reform applies
where:
(1) EPA initiates or is engaged in ongoing negotiations for a remedial
design or remedial action (RD/RA) at a site or for a non-time-critical
(NTC) removal at a National Priorities List (NPL) site under the
Superfund Accelerated Cleanup Model (SACM);
(2) a PRP or group of PRPs agrees to conduct the RD/RA of RA pursu-
ant to a consent decree or the NTC removal pursuant to an administra-
tive order on consent (AOC) or consent decree; and
(3) an "orphan share" exists at the site.
Id. at 2. For a definition of orphan share, as used by EPA in the Interim Guidance,
see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
88. See id. (noting "EPA anticipates that its willingness to contribute to settle-
ment, based in part upon an increased emphasis on the effect of an orphan share,
will facilitate settlement with performing parties").
89. See id. EPA and the Department of Justice "expanded the orphan share
reform" in September 1997. Annual Report 1997, supra note 13, at 41 (describing
factors for the government to consider when deciding whether and how much to
compromise a cost recovery claim based on the existence of a significant orphan
share").
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Consistent with the purpose and goals set forth in the Interim
Guidance, EPA later offered $57 million to parties in recognition of
the orphan share at twenty-four Superfund sites.90 EPA stated that
this compensation might be accomplished through forgiveness of
past transaction costs and projected oversight costs, subject to fund-
ing availability for the program. 91 Notably, EPA described the 1996
orphan share reform as a "fundamental and permanent change in
EPA's enforcement process."92 Moreover, EPA suggested that this
orphan share reform had reduced litigation and transaction costs
by reducing the number of disputes over who should bear the bur-
den of the orphan shares.93
V. IMPACT OF EPA ORPHAN SHARE REFORM ON FuTURE
SUPERFUND CLEANUP
A. The Effect of Orphan Share Reform on Recent Legislation
Since EPA's announcement to compensate parties for some
portion of the orphan share liability at Superfund sites, Congress
has not provided an appropriation for orphan share compensa-
tion.9 4 Congress has also failed to reinstate the Superfund taxing
authority which expired in 1995.95 Moreover, the Interim Gui-
90. See generally Annual Report 1996, supra note 81 (noting purpose of EPA was
to increase fairness for PRPs agreeing to perform cleanups). EPA orphan share
funding initiatives continued and EPA provided more than $53 million at 20 sites
in fiscal year 1997, for a combined total of more than $100 million in orphan share
compensation in fiscal years 1996 and 1997. See Annual Report 1997, supra note 13,
at 42 (stating "this compensation creates incentives for viable parties to perform
cleanups and reduces the time required to complete settlement agreements").
91. See generally Annual Report 1996, supra note 81. PRPs incur costs at sites in
part because of EPA's need to oversee the quality of the work they are doing. EPA
describes oversight as "the process EPA uses to ensure that all studies and work
performed by PRPs are technically sound and comply with the statute, regulations,
guidances, policies, and the signed settlement agreement... [which] may include
submission of reports for approval, meeting interim milestones, or the scheduling
of field visits." Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. EPA suggested that the PRPs who have a larger burden of responsi-
bility at the sites have benefitted from Superfund orphan share reforms due to
reductions in transaction costs and forgiveness of oversight costs. See id.
94. See id. Notably, in late 1997, Carol M. Browner, EPA Administrator "lob-
bied for Congress to appropriate an extra $650 million for the next two years
above the $1.4 billion for the superfund program to double the pace of hazardous
waste cleanups by 2000." Congress Passes EPA Appropriations Bill, Clearing Way for
Expected Clinton Approval 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1223 (Oct. 17, 1997). To date, no
such appropriations have been authorized.
95. See generally Statement of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and En-
vironment, U.S. House of Representatives, (visited Feb. 4, 1998) <http://
www.epa.gov/superfund/oeer/whatsnew/test1029.htrn> [hereinafter Statement of
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dance issued by EPA represented an approach for fiscal year 1996
only, and is devoid of any EPA pledges for future orphan share
funding. EPA, however, did follow the guidance and continued to
provide orphan share funding in fiscal year 1997. As a result, it is
uncertain whether EPA's orphan share reforms will continue to ef-
fectively induce PRPs to reach settlement and advance the cleanup
of hazardous waste sites. Superfund reform remains at a standstill
while democrats and republicans have been deadlocked in their de-
bate of the issues since the compromise Superfund bill in the 103rd
Congress.9
6
1. Lack of Superfund Reform Legislation Prior to Election 1996
Not surprisingly, scholars, politicians and academics maintain
varying views regarding why Congress failed to adopt Superfund
legislation prior to the 1996 congressional elections. Environmen-
tal issues, including Superfund, may or may not have played key
roles in the 1996 congressional elections. Some believe that the
effort to make the 1996 congressional elections "a referendum on
environmental issues failed."97 Others believe that the election year
was "historic" because the environmental conservation movement
demonstrated that environmental issues significantly influence vot-
ers.98 Despite such conflicting views, Congress has passed major en-
Carol M. Browner] (stating "the Administration remains concerned over the expi-
ration of the authority to replenish the Superfund Trust Fund").
96. See Looking Ahead to the 105th, 14 Envtl. Forum (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 1, at
30-32 (jan.-Feb. 1997) (noting that in 1994, Commerce Committee presented
Superfund legislation favored by chemical industry, environmentalists, administra-
tion, republicans and democrats that was "killed" by Bob Dole just before the No-
vember election); The Mechanic, 15 Envtl. Forum (Envtl. L. Inst.) No. 1, at 38 (Jan.-
Feb. 1998) (statement of Elliott Laws, former EPA Assistant Administrator for Haz-
ardous Waste) ("We tried comprehensive reform in the 103rd Congress, and it
failed. Comprehensive reform was not a bad idea; in fact, it's still a good idea.").
97. See Looking Ahead to the 105th, supra note 96, at 32 (opinion of Jonathan
Adler, Director of Environmental Studies Competitive Enterprise Institute). Adler
stated that "where environmental issues played a role, they did not always help
candidates that supported more regulation." Id. Moreover, Adler posited that a
great majority of anti-regulatory incumbents won reelection, despite being "very
critical of existing environmental programs." Id.; see also Superfund: House GOP
Pledges Progress on Reform, Says Help From EPA Would Be "Welcome,' 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1656 (Dec. 13, 1996) (noting comment of Rep. Thomas Bliley (R-Va.) that
"the administration wasn't interested in cleanups; it was interested in
campaigning").
98. See Looking Ahead to the 105th, supra note 96, at 30-32 (noting that "the
evidence is abundantly clear that Americans don't want environmental regulations
rolled back"). Deb Callahan, President, League of Conservation Voters, noted a
recent bipartisan poll by Peter Hart Research and Research Management Strategy,
Inc., which "showed that, by three to one, the American public believes environ-
mental regulations do not go far enough." Id. Moreover, Callahan expressed her
19981
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vironmental laws before October in election years on very few
occasions.99 Even so, the fact remains that although the 1996 con-
gressional elections have come and gone, and Superfund bills have
been proposed by both democrats and republicans, no Superfund
amendments have been enacted. 100 These issues remain at a stand-
still while the courts continue to hear CERCLA liability and orphan
share litigation arguments.
2. Reauthorization of Superfund Taxing Authority
The Clinton administration has failed to reauthorize
Superfund taxing authority since its expiration in 1995.101 Many
politicians, industry lobbyists and academics agree that Superfund
taxes should not be reinstated until a broad legislative reform of
CERCLA takes place. 102 Others, however, believe that Superfund
opinion that the congressional elections show that America desires bipartisanship
and strong environmental regulation, noting that "in eight of nine [districts or
states], environment was the number one or two issue that persuaded voters to
vote for or against a certain candidate." Id. at 31.
Additionally, Don Ritter, Chairman, National Environmental Policy Institute,
in the same forum, agreed that the nation desires a quality environment, and in
doing so equated environmental benefits with regulation. See id. Ritter, however,
did not believe that the election was a mandate for more or stronger regulation;
rather, he noted that "a lot of environmentalists believe we can achieve environ-
mental goals by reducing the burden on the system as opposed to increasing it."
Id. at 33.
99. See id. at 31 (noting statement of DanielJ. Weiss, Political Director, Sierra
Club).
100. See Superfund: House GOP Pledge Progress on Reform, Says Help from EPA
Would be 'Welcome, 'supra note 97, at 1656 (citing "common complaint among con-
gressional Republicans - that the administration's election politics hindered re-
form in the last Congress"). In 1995 and 1996, Republicans presented two
comprehensive legislative approaches, and 26 specific proposals on varying
Superfund legislation. See id. An alternative proposal to a measure introduced by
Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio) was released to House democrats on April
30. See id.; see also Major Hurdles Seen for Reform Efforts, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1958
(Jan. 24, 1997) (discussing "obstacle course of possible piecemeal attempts [and]
an administration that is sending mixed signals on its committment to rewriting
the legislation, and the struggle to maintain bipartisan coalitions on Capitol Hill").
101. See Interim Guidance, supra note 3. In fact, the Clinton administration
has failed to reinstate Superfund taxes to date. See generally Statement of Carol M.
Browner, supra note 95 ("In addition to the expiration of the tax, we are disap-
pointed that Congress did not provide the 1st year of the President's request for
additional appropriated funds to address the backlog of Superfund sites that are
currently awaiting cleanup.").
102. See Superfund: CERCLA Reform, Tax Authority Must Be Combined, CMA Tells
Treasury, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1850 (Jan. 3, 1997) (citing letter released by the
Treasury Department on December 30, 1995, from Frederick L. Webber, Presi-
dent, Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) (stating that Webber and CMA
are "greatly concerned that any effort to reinstate these [Superfund] taxes, other
than as an integral part of a superfund reform bill, would effectively spell the end
of superfund reform in the 105th Congress")); see also Looking Ahead to the 105th,
[Vol. IX: p. 73
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/3
SUPERFUND ORPHAN SHARE REFORM
lacks the capacity to adequately finance cleanup activities and prop-
erly effectuate reform initiatives without reauthorization to replen-
ish the Superfund trust fund through taxation. 10 3
B. The Effect of Orphan Share Reform on Future CERCLA
Legislation
In December 1996, republicans and democrats pledged to
work together to produce a Superfund reform bill in the 105th
Congress. 10 4 Some members of Congress posit that EPA's new pol-
icy with respect to the payment of orphan shares offers an excellent
opportunity to resolve this issue in negotiations between EPA and
setting parties. If EPA continues to commit orphan share funds, all
or part of the orphan share issue will be resolved prior to the cost
allocation phase. Whether EPA can achieve this aim is questiona-
supra note 96, at 40 (statement of Elliott Laws, former EPA assistant administrator
for hazardous waste) (noting "I don't think there's any chance we're going to get a
comprehensive reform bill"); Passage of 'Overdue' Reforms Would Allow Focus on CWA,
Subcommittee Chairman Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1913 (Jan. 17, 1997) (noting
"[r] ecent comments from administration officials that a comprehensive reform bill
may not be necessary were dismissed as 'laughable' by Representative Sherwood
Boehlert" and "Presidential politics 'reared its ugly head' and spoiled the effort
[for reform]").
103. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 6-7 (describing CERCLA as "a black hole
that indiscriminately devours all who come near it").
104. See House GOP Pledges Progress on Reform, Says Help from EPA Would Be Wel-
come, supra note 97, at 1656. Republican House Representative Thomas Bliley (R-
Va.), Chairman of the House Commerce Committee, stated he expected "some
movement" on Superfund reforms by the Clinton administration, as well as good
faith negotiations from Commerce Committee democrats. Id. He also stated that,
Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), ranking minority member of the commit-
tee, has "pledged to work with [him] in a bipartisan fashion." Id. A spokesman for
Dingell, however, confirmed only that Bliley and Dingell "had a general conversa-
tion about [Superfund reform] issues," and that "they didn't discuss any particular
bill." Id.; see also Major Hurdles Seen For Reform Efforts, supra note 100, at 1958 (citing
statement of John Arlington, Senior Counsel for Federal Affairs and Policy with
the American Insurance Association) (noting "'I think the majority is very inter-
ested in comprehensive reform' on both the House and Senate side"). Arguably,
however, bipartisan efforts have been and will be ineffective to initiate needed re-
form. See The Mechanic, supra note 96, at 40. Elliott Laws, former EPA Asssistant
Administrator for Hazardous Waste, stated:
I don't think there's any chance we're going to get a comprehensive re-
form bill. First, the gulf between Republicans in Congress and the Demo-
crats in the administration is too great to cross at this point .... Second,
the push was coming from the corporate side, and now the spark is gone.
It basically comes down to dollars .... One of the criticisms of the ad-
ministrative reforms is that they are just administrative - as easily as we
put them in, a future administration could take them out. That's why you
need legislation. In addition, the administrative reforms are cumber-
some, some of them are based on admittedly shaky legal interpretations
of the statute.
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ble. If Congress fails to reauthorize Superfund taxing authority,
EPA will be forced to work with a weakening Superfund with lim-
ited funds available for orphan share funding settlements. 105 As a
result, PRPs will no longer benefit from EPA's reform efforts to
"feed" the orphan shares with Superfund dollars. Instead, PRPs will
again face time-consuming and expensive litigation over orphan
share issues. Therefore, it is apparent that to initiate permanent
change, democrats and republicans must remain committed to bi-
partisan reform by enacting CERCLA legislation that includes both
a reauthorization of Superfund taxation, as well as an appropriation
for orphan share funding.
Rachel M. White
105. See Statement of Carol M. Browner, supra note 95 (noting Congressional
Budget Office "projected that the [Superfund] Trust Fund will, at the end of next
fiscal year, have less remaining than will be needed to keep the program operat-
ing, to keep site cleanups underway, in the following fiscal year").
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